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I. Introduction
Tribal governments are an often-overlooked entity within the United
States’ federal system. Tribes are sovereign entities that are free from much
state interference. However, tribes have also historically been deemed
dependent domestic nations over which Congress can exercise much
authority. But Congress must usually designate when it uses this control.
Environmental law within Indian Country presents a unique aspect of
federalism. Initially, the federal response to environmental law ignored the
tribe’s role. However, tribal governments were given larger roles in national
environmental policies as their sovereignty became increasingly
recognized. Most federal environmental statutes now recognize tribes as
states through treatment as state (“TAS”) provisions. However, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) is the only major
environmental statute that does not contain a TAS provision. As such, tribes
are treated as municipalities, rendering tribal governments ineligible for
many EPA-specific benefits of the RCRA. However, tribal governments are
still subjected to the RCRA penalties for non-compliance. Not surprisingly,
many tribal governments have implemented their own solid and hazardous
waste regimes. These often either mimic the RCRA’s form or specifically
adopt the RCRA and other federal requirements as a regulatory floor.
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct.
2452 (2020), may have added another wrinkle to the tribal authority
calculus. Specifically, it is possible that more former tribal land will be rerecognized as Indian Country. This could lead to more civil regulatory
jurisdiction by tribal governments over non-Indians, particularly in the solid
waste disposal field.
Congress should amend the RCRA to include a TAS provision. This
would not, however, automatically extend TAS status to Oklahoma tribes,
which Congress singled out for TAS exclusion. Perhaps, however, the
specter of increased tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians in
eastern Oklahoma will convince Congress to reexamine its prohibition on
Oklahoma tribal TAS designation.
This paper will first provide the general background of tribal sovereignty
and jurisdiction. Second, this paper will provide a background of
environmental federalism, including the tribe’s unique position within it.
Third, this paper will discuss the RCRA and its application to tribes.
Fourth, this paper will discuss some tribes’ solid waste regulation programs.
Fifth, this paper will discuss McGirt and its potential for re-recognizing
more Indian Country and the possibility tribes could exert civil regulatory
jurisdiction over this Indian Country. Finally, this paper makes policy
recommendations, including that Congress should amend the RCRA to
include a TAS provision and potential solid waste programs tribes could
adopt.
II. Background
A. Tribal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
There are two broad planks of federal Congressional authority over
American Indian tribes. The first is the Indian Commerce Clause, stating
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes.”1 The second is Congress’s authority to act as a guardian of tribes. 2
Often, Congress will explicitly state both sets of authority in statutes
concerning tribes.3 Statutes of general applicability (such as environmental
laws) can also apply to tribes and American Indians if Congress so
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
2. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 & 13 (1831).
3. See, e.g., The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901 (Westlaw
through P.L. 116-259) (“Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and
the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people”).
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intended.4 Such statutes’ application to American Indians is seen easiest
when Congress explicitly states that it applies to tribes and American
Indians.5 Statutes of general applicability may also apply to tribes if
Congressional intent is “clearly expressed in the legislative history or by the
existence of a statutory scheme requiring national or uniform application.” 6
The earliest federal environmental laws did not explicitly mention tribes. 7
However, courts have found that some of these earlier statutes apply to
tribes, and more recent TAS amendments have explicitly extended
environmental laws to tribes.8
Federal authority over tribes does not remove a tribe’s inherent
sovereignty.9 Tribal powers are not delegated powers but “inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.” 10 As Tsosie
mentions, federal environmental laws “do not confer environmental
regulatory authority upon the Indian nations; rather, the Indian nations’
inherent sovereignty already enabled them to exercise such authority in
most cases.”11 Such authority also enables tribes to adopt more stringent
regulations than federal statutes require. 12 However, effective
environmental regulation can likely occur only if tribes can regulate “nonIndians on the reservation as well.”13 This paper turns next to tribal
jurisdiction.
Solid waste disposal is largely regulatory in nature, but certain tribal
codes have implicated civil adjudicatory and criminal jurisdiction.
Additionally, tribes located inside Public Law 280 (“P.L. 280”) states are
subjected to more state jurisdiction than tribes in non-P.L. 280 states.

4. Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal
Projects on Indian Lands, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 229, 232 (Winter 1993).
5. Id. at 232-33.
6. Id. at 233.
7. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 225, 233
(Fall 1996).
8. Id. at 233-34.
9. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.01 (Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2017)
(hereinafter, Cohen’s Handbook).
10. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); see Cohen’s Handbook,
supra, § 4.01(1)(a).
11. Tsosie, supra, at 234 (emphasis original).
12. Id.
13. Walker, supra, at 233.
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1. Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction
Tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction requires determining if the regulated
area is Indian Country and whether the regulated persons are American
Indians, tribal members, or non-Indians.14 First, Indian Country means:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States . . . ,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same. 15
This definition of Indian Country applies to both civil and criminal
jurisdiction despite its location in the federal criminal code16 and
determining if something occurred in Indian Country is often the first step
in any legal question involving American Indian tribes. Additionally, by
virtue of a tribe’s sovereign status, tribal governments wield “exclusive
tribal jurisdiction” over tribal members in Indian Country unless “there is a
specific federal law stating otherwise.”17
Tribal civil regulatory analysis becomes more difficult when the tribe is
attempting to regulate non-Indians in Indian Country.18 Specifically, “the
Supreme Court has curtailed tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,
unless the interests of the tribe or member Indians are affected.” 19 The
Montana test is used to determine if a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction
in Indian Country over non-Indians. 20
14. The Supreme Court has not clearly determined “whether the appropriate distinction
for applying general jurisdictional rules in Indian country is the distinctions between tribal
members and nonmembers or between Indians and non-Indians.” Cohen’s Handbook, supra
note 9, § 6.01; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004) (applying a
member/nonmember distinction).
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
16. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998) (stating,
“Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal criminal jurisdiction, we have
recognized that is also generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction.”); Jill Elise Grant,
The Navajo Nation EPA’s Experience with “Treatment as a State” and Primacy, 21 Nat.
Res. & Env’t 9, 10 (Winter 2007).
17. Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 9, § 6.01.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Montana test is only necessary “when a tribe asserts its inherent authority over
non-Indians.” Grant, supra, 13.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

6

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

Montana v. United States involved the Crow Nation’s attempt to
“prohibit all hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the tribe on non-Indian
property within reservation boundaries.” 21 The Supreme Court stated there
is a presumption that tribes do not have civil regulatory jurisdiction over
non-members by relying on Oliphant’s rationale.22 However, the Court also
noted that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservation, even on
non-Indian fee lands.”23 Specifically, Montana established two ways for
tribes to rebut the presumption that they lack civil regulatory jurisdiction
and thus exert authority over non-Indians in Indian Country. First, “A tribe
may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribes or its members through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”24 Second, tribes can exert civil
regulatory authority over non-Indians in Indian Country when the nonIndian’s conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 25
If a tribal government cannot establish civil regulatory jurisdiction over
non-Indians in Indian Country, then state governments may be able to.
However, there is a presumption against state environmental regulatory
authority in Indian Country unless a state can refute this presumption, e.g.,
if the federal government were to expressly authorize state jurisdiction over
environmental regulation in Indian Country. 26
2. Tribal Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
While most tribal environmental laws likely fall under civil regulatory
jurisdiction—encompassing permits, fines, and injunctions—it is also
possible that civil adjudicatory jurisdiction applies. 27 Montana’s two-prong
test is still used to determine whether a tribe can exert civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over a non-Indian. Additionally, Strate v. A-1 Contractors held
21. 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
22. Id. at 565 (stating that “[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority
in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that the
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe”).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 566.
26. Richard A. Du Bey, et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment, 18 Envtl. L.,
449, 455 n. 25 (Spring 1988).
27. See Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 504 (making solid waste landfill
permits conditional on the applicant being subject to Navajo Nation laws).
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that the Williams test can be used to show that the tribe does not exert civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction.28 Under Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),
there is a presumption of tribal authority in Indian Country that the state can
rebut. The test is, “Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress
[specifically envisioning P.L. 280], the question has always been whether
the state action [meaning the assertion of state civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction] infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.”29
3. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
Likely, most tribal environmental laws involve civil regulatory or civil
adjudicatory jurisdictions. However, some tribal environmental laws invoke
criminal penalties. 30 As such, a brief survey of tribal criminal jurisdiction is
warranted. First, under the McBratney line of cases, states exert criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian on non-Indian crime in Indian Country.31 This
is the only legal state criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country for non-P.L.
280 states. Second, the federal government exerts criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country under several statutes. One is the Indian Country Crimes
Act, stating that federal criminal law of its enclaves (except the District of
Columbia) applies in Indian Country. 32 There are three exceptions to this
jurisdiction: (1) the crime is committed by an American Indian against
another American Indian or another American Indian’s property; (2) the
tribe has already punished the perpetrator; and (3) if treaty rights grant the
tribe jurisdiction.33 The second statute is the Assimilative Crimes Act that
assimilates state crimes from the surrounding state that are not part of the
federal code and applies that state code against American Indians in Indian
Country. 34 The third is the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) that subjects an
American Indian committing any enumerated crime against anyone in
Indian Country to federal criminal jurisdiction.35 Finally, tribes exert
28. 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
29. Williams at 271.
30. See Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 503(B).
31. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Draper v. United States, 164
U.S. 240 (1896); and New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259); see Unites States v. Marcyes,
557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that only state crimes, not regulations, assimilate
under the Act).
35. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259) (enumerating, inter alia,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, arson, burglary, and robbery).
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criminal jurisdiction solely over American Indians. 36 However, many tribal
courts are essentially limited to misdemeanor courts under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, which limits tribal sentencing to one year for any one offense
(not to exceed three years total) or fines of $5,000 per offense (not to
exceed $15,000 total).37 But tribes can elect to come under the Tribal Law
and Order Act, 25 U.SC. §§ 1302(b)-(d), allowing increased sentences of
up to three years and consecutive sentences of up to nine years.38 39
4. Public Law 28040
Under P.L. 280, certain states have “jurisdiction over offenses committed
by or against Indians in . . . Indian country . . . to the same extent that such
State . . . has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the
State.”41 In full P.L. 280 states, the state exerts criminal and civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction. 42 P.L. 280 applies to six mandatory states. 43 P.L.
280 is also available to any other state. 44 Ten optional states have accepted
P.L. 280 jurisdiction and some have accepted less than full criminal and
36. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribes, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (stating that tribes cannot
exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
37. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(b) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
38. Tribes must meet “certain procedural requirements” to qualify for the Act. David H.
Getches, et. al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law, 585-86 (7th ed. 2017).
39. Tribes exerting this enhanced sentencing authority are the Cherokee Nation,
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,
Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, Hopi Tribe, Muscogee
(Creek) Nation, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, and Tulalip Tribes. National
Congress of American Indians, Tribal Law & Order Act (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021)
https://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/resources/tribal-law-order-act.
40. A detailed accounting of P.L. 280 is beyond the scope of this paper. For a more
minute discussion of P.L. 280’s implications, see generally Cohen’s Handbook, supra, §
6.04(3); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535-594 (1974-1975).
41. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
42. See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty, 426 U.S. 373, 385 (1976) (holding that Congress intended
for P.L. 280 states to exert criminal and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, but not civil
regulatory jurisdiction that remained with the tribe); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208-10 (1987) (reaffirming Bryan’s reading of P.L. 280 and
implementing a prohibitory/regulatory distinction to determine whether a law is criminal or
regulatory in nature).
43. The mandatory states are California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake
Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), Wisconsin (except
the Menominee Reservation), and Alaska (also with some exceptions). Cohen’s Handbook,
supra, § 6.04(3)(a) nn. 45 & 46.
44. Id. § 6.04(3)(a).
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civil adjudicatory jurisdictions. 45 States are also permitted to retrocede all or
part of their assumed jurisdiction to the federal government. 46 Additionally,
P.L. 280 was amended to require tribal consent to any future P.L. 280
states.47
B. Environmental Federalism
Tribal authority to regulate environmental concerns in Indian Country
exists from two sources. “First, Indian tribes possess inherent powers to
govern their territories,” and while federal law may limit tribal authority “in
certain respects, tribes nonetheless retain substantial authority over matters
affecting tribal health and welfare.” 48 This means that tribes can enact their
own environmental laws. 49 “Second, Indian tribes may exercise powers
authorized by Congress” including assuming “primary regulatory authority,
or primacy, for administrating most of the federal environmental programs
in Indian country.”50
Generally, federal environmental laws apply to Indian Country with
either the federal government (usually the EPA) or tribal governments
administrating or enforcing those laws. 51 This federal authority usually does
not replace a tribe’s inherent authority to promulgate environmental laws. 52
Some federal statutes (like the Safe Drinking Water Act) expressly state the
statute was not intended to waive tribal sovereignty, while other laws (like
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act) will preempt tribal authority if
the laws are not “‘substantively the same’ as federal law.”53 Many tribal
governments regulate their environments through federal programs. 54
Programs that require EPA approval are then challenged based on “the
federal administrative action rather than the tribal plans and standards.” 55
45. Optional states are Arizona (partial jurisdiction), Florida (full jurisdiction), Idaho
(partial jurisdiction), Iowa (partial jurisdiction), Montana (partial after some retrocessions),
Nevada (fully retroceded), North Dakota (partial jurisdiction), South Dakota (partial
jurisdiction), Utah (jurisdiction contingent on tribal consent, which has not occurred), and
Washington (partial jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country). Id. § 6.04(3)(a) n. 47.
46. Id. § 6.04(3)(a).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 10.01(1).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 10.01(2)(a).
52. Id. § 10.01.
53. Id. § 10.01(2)(b).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Tribal governments are also subject to federal regulations and potential
environmental liability if the tribe meets the statutory definition of a
person.56
1. Federal Environmental Regulation Background
The modern, national environmental regulation system took several
decades to establish and occurred only because state governments failed to
protect their environments.57 Up to the 1960s, the federal government
largely treated environmental regulation as a state concern. 58 Early federal
environmental statutes (like the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Solid Waste
Disposal Act) used federal money to fund state environmental measures. 59
However, states were reluctant to pass stringent measures for fear that
industries would relocate to other states. 60 Popular support for
environmental regulation rose in the 1960s, primarily spurred by pesticide
use and public works projects that affected the environment. 61 Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), further spurred popular support for environmental
regulation by making suits against federal agencies a valid engine of
environmental activism. 62 Percival suggests that environmental concern was
linked to a more national consciousness, stating, “Like civil rights law,
environmental law became federalized only after a long history of state
failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally important
interests.”63
The 1970s featured a major shift in federal involvement in environmental
regulation. Federal environmental regulation in the early 1970s targeted
federal agencies (and their projects), which were often the worst polluters. 64
President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970,
requiring “federal agencies to consider environmental impacts and
alternative courses of action before taking any action likely to have a

56. See, e.g., Blue Legs v. BIA, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding the tribal
government liable for environmental damages); Cohen’s Handbook, supra, § 10.01(2)(c).
57. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1146-47 (1995).
58. Id. at 1155-57.
59. Id. at 1157.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1157-59.
62. Id. at 1159.
63. Id. at 1144.
64. Id. at 1158.
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significant effect on the environment.”65 The EPA was also created in 1970
and Congress “charged [it] with implementing the national regulatory
legislation that followed.”66
Congress passed “more than twenty major federal environmental laws”
in the 1970s, including the modern Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. 67
These new laws were “comprehensive, national regulatory programs to
control air and water pollution.”68 The Clean Air Act of 1970 contained the
first citizen suit provision, which was a model used in future environmental
statutes to help ensure enforcement.69 These programs also invoked
federalism principles, giving states the flexibility to implement their own
plans to reach the newly enacted federal minimums.70 Consequently, most
environmental statutes did not preempt state authority. 71 In 1974,
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1974) held that federal
environmental laws did not interfere with state sovereignty. 72
The 1980s saw another switch in federal environmental regulation. The
1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) is an example of the change. Specifically,
CERCLA moved away from “a national regulatory program,” preferring
instead to punish “hazardous substance releases” by imposing strict
liability.73 According to Percival, CERCLA also changed the “cooperative
federalism model.”74 Under CERCLA, the EPA could delegate cleanup
decisions to states, but it refused to for over a decade and often
administered state standards under CERCLA authority. 75 Additionally, the
Reagan administration was less sympathetic to environmental concerns than
its predecessors.76 This caused Congress to seek more “prescriptive
environmental standards” that forced the “EPA to implement . . .
environmental laws in a more expeditious fashion.” 77 This move towards
65. Id. at 1159.
66. Id. at 1160.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1161.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 was one of the rare exemptions of a
federal statute that did preempt state authority. Id. at 1163.
72. Id. at 1163.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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efficiency included establishing “new statutory deadlines for EPA action”
and establishing “specific sanctions if deadlines were not met.” 78
Trends in the 1990s further limited federal environmental regulation.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), evidenced the Supreme
Court’s greater willingness “to assert judicially enforceable limits on
federal authority,” further seen in the United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) decision. 79 Additionally, the Clinton administration and Congress
were concerned about unfunded mandates—environmental or other—to
state or local governments. Executive Order 12,875 prohibited agencies
from imposing unfunded mandates not required by the statute unless the
agency informed the Office of Management and Budget of efforts to
consult with state and local governments, and the agency justified the
mandate. 80 In 1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act
making it much more difficult to pass mandates that would cost state or
local governments more than $50 million annually. 81
2. Tribes and Environmental Federalism
Federal environmental regulation largely ignored the role of Indian tribes
prior to the 1980s. Tribal governments traditionally managed natural
resources in Indian Country, but it was not until the 1980s that tribes helped
develop and implement federal environmental programs. 82 This earlier
disregard for tribal roles caused lands and waters in Indian Country to be
less protected than those of adjacent, non-Indian areas.83 Additionally, it
meant tribes did not receive federal funding for environmental programs. 84
This federal position began to change in 1983 when President Reagan
announced that the federal government would work with tribes “on a
government-to-government basis” and encourage tribal self-government as
part of his philosophy that “responsibilities and resources should be
restored to the governments which are closest to the people served.” 85 The

78. Id. at 1163-64.
79. Id. at 1166-67.
80. Id. at 1167.
81. Id. at 1168.
82. Du Bey et al., supra, 450.
83. Id. at 451.
84. Id.
85. Ronald Reagan, Statement in Indian Policy (January 24, 1983), Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library & Museum Archives (last accessed Oct. 17, 2020)
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-indian-policy.
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EPA had already adopted a policy of tribal self-determination in 1980, but
it vigorously responded to Reagan’s announcement in 1984.86
The EPA’s Treatment of Tribes
On November 8, 1984, the EPA released the EPA Policy for the
Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (“EPA
Policy”). Its stated goal was to “set forth the principles that will guide the
Agency” in working with tribal governments to address “environmental
management” in Indian Country.87 The EPA recognized that tribal
environmental regulation in Indian Country “cannot be accomplished
immediately,” and would take “careful and conscientious work by EPA, the
Tribes, and many others.”88 Additionally, it would require “changes in
applicable statutory authorities and regulations.”89 The EPA wanted to
“give special considerations to Tribal interests in making Agency policy,
and to ensure the close involvement of Tribal Governments in making
decision and managing environmental programs affecting reservation
lands.”90 The EPA Policy set out nine principles to reach these goals that
utilized Reagan’s government-to-government policy favoring treating tribes
like states.
The EPA first recognized tribal sovereignty and committed itself to
working with tribes “on a one-to-one . . . government-to-government”
basis.91 Second, the EPA recognized “tribal governments as the primary
parties for setting standards, making environmental policy decisions and
managing programs for reservations.”92 This principle outlined the EPA’s
choice to treat tribes “as the appropriate non-Federal parties” for making
environmental decisions in Indian Country. 93 The EPA was committing to
treating tribal governments like state governments, the interests and
participation of which were “traditionally” accounted for and encouraged
by the EPA. 94
Third, the EPA committed to taking “affirmative steps to encourage and
assist tribes in assuming regulatory and program management
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Du Bey et al., supra, at 451 n. 1.
EPA Policy for the Admin. of Env’t Programs on Indian Reservations.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations and capitalization omitted).
Id. (capitalization omitted).
Id.
Id.
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responsibilities for reservation lands.” 95 This included “providing grants
and other assistance to Tribes similar to what we provide State
Governments.” It also envisioned tribes assuming the same
“responsibilities” for Indian Country that had been “traditionally delegated
to State Governments for non-reservation lands” and under “similar
terms.”96 The EPA further committed to overseeing environmental
programs in Indian Country until tribal governments were ready and
capable of assuming those programs.
Fourth, the EPA committed to taking “appropriate steps to remove
existing legal and procedural impediments” that prevented it from working
directly with tribal governments.97 Fifth, the EPA committed to maintaining
the federal government’s trust role whenever policies might affect the
environment of Indian Country. 98 Sixth, the EPA would “encourage
cooperation between tribal, state and local governments,” recognizing that
such cooperation “between equals and neighbors often serves the best
interests of both,” especially in environmental regulation. 99 Seventh, the
EPA would work with other federal agencies to delineate responsibilities
“to protect human health and the environment on reservations.”100
Eighth, the EPA would “work cooperatively with Tribal leadership” to
ensure compliance with regulations and to “provid[e] technical support and
consultation as necessary” to ensure compliance. 101 The EPA once more
recognized tribal sovereignty and stated it would only directly intervene,
either administratively or judicially, if: (1) there was “a significant threat to
human health or the environment,” (2) direct action could “reasonably be
expected to achieve effective results in a timely manner,” and (3) other
methods by the federal government would fail “to correct the problem in a
timely fashion.” However, the EPA would still intervene as normal if
“reservation facilities [were] clearly owned or managed by private parties
and there is no substantial Tribal interest or control involved,” but would
attempt to work cooperatively “with the affected Tribal Government.” 102
Lastly, the EPA committed to including these principles and goals into its

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. (capitalization omitted).
Id.
Id. (capitalization omitted).
Id.
Id. (capitalization omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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long-term plans, budget, policies, legislation initiatives, and regulation
development.103
The EPA actively adhered to its policy, especially the fourth point of
lobbying to amend current environmental statutes to enable the agency to
directly work with tribal governments.104 Beginning in 1986, Congress
amended most federal environmental statutes to include TAS provisions. 105
Under these TAS provisions, tribal governments must generally apply to
the EPA to determine if it is eligible to undertake primacy and administer
the environmental programs to the federal minimum. 106 Some statutes do
not require a tribe to seek primacy, and newer federal environmental
statutes contain TAS provisions when passed. 107 Overall, most federal
environmental statutes have some provision designating tribal TAS status
or allowing them to apply for such status; however, the RCRA is the only
major environmental statute that has not been amended to treat tribes as
states.108
III. The RCRA
Like other areas of environmental regulation, solid waste disposal was
primarily a state concern before the RCRA. 109 The RCRA’s Congressional
findings showed that “the problems of waste disposal . . . have become a
matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action
through financial and technical leadership” to develop new methods of solid
and hazardous waste disposal. 110 The RCRA is “enforceable through civil,
administrative, criminal, and citizen suit remedies.”111 The EPA may not
bring a suit if a state with a federally authorized program has already
brought suit. 112 Overall, the “RCRA dramatically increased the scope of
federal authority over the regulation of hazardous waste.” 113

103. Id.
104. Cohen’s Handbook, supra, §10.02(1).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. §10.02(2).
109. Du Bey, et. al., supra, at 457-58.
110. Id. at 457 (quoting Congressional findings at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a)(4)) (emphasis
omitted).
111. Linda A. Malone, 1 Envtl. Reg. of Land Use § 9:11 (2020) (Westlaw).
112. Id.
113. Du Bey et. al., supra, at 457.
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Consistent with federalism themes, states are still free to promulgate
their own hazardous waste programs, but the programs must first receive
EPA authorization.114 A state’s first program is an interim program
designed to determine if it is “substantially equivalent” to federal
standards.115 The second, permanent program is authorized if the state’s
program is “equivalent to the federal program, enforceable, and consistent
with other federal and state programs.” 116 State approved plans can receive
federal funding for implementation and management. 117
The RCRA was intended to “protect groundwater from disposal of
wastes,” and it serves a dual role of protecting groundwater and regulating
waste disposal.118 The RCRA’s solid waste disposal definition includes
“what is commonly considered solid waste as well as liquids and contained
gases.”119 States are required to create two plans under the RCRA: “one for
solid waste disposal and another for hazardous waste.”120 The EPA must
create guidelines for state solid waste disposal that considers the different
“regional, geological, hydrologic, climatic, and other circumstances”
necessary to protect “ground and surface waters from leachate
contamination” and the reasonable protection of both surface waters from
runoff and ambient air quality.121 State plans “must distinguish between
‘sanitary landfills’ and open dumps” and these plans must “prohibit
establishment of new open dumps.”122 Further, open dumps must be shut
down or made into sanitary landfills.
Much of the RCRA is designed to prevent contamination. 123 Section
7003 concerns “remedying contamination that has already occurred” and
applies only to solid or hazardous waste.124 The Administrator of the EPA
may sue “any past or present owners . . . of treatment, storage, or disposal
facilit[ies], any past or present generator [of waste], and any past or present
transporter” in federal district court if these activities “present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 125 Section
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 458.
Id. at 457 (punctuation and numbering omitted).
Id. (punctuation and numbering omitted).
Malone § 9:11, supra.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Linda A. Malone, 1 Envtl. Reg, of Land Use § 9:12 (2020) (Westlaw).
Id.
Id.
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7003 also may require landfill facilities and perhaps some storage facilities
“to take corrective actions beyond facility boundaries if necessary to protect
health and the environment” contingent upon facilities receiving permission
for such action.126 Section 7003 applies strict liability and persons acting in
corporate capacities can be “individually liable if personally involved in or
directly responsible for conduct violating § 7003.”127 Additionally, state and
local governments, and possibly federal facilities, are subject to § 7003.128
A. The RCRA and Tribes
The RCRA treats tribes as municipalities, not states, and is the only
major federal environmental statute without a TAS provision. The RCRA
“neither specifically authorizes Indian tribes to develop their own
hazardous waste management programs nor explicitly provides that federal
authority extends to Indian lands.” 129
The EPA interpreted the RCRA as excluding state regulatory jurisdiction
over Indian Country.130 Washington State challenged this reading in
1985.131 However, the EPA’s reading was upheld, precluding Washington
State’s enforcement of the RCRA in Indian Country. 132
The EPA, likely adhering to its 1984 policy outlines, unilaterally
attempted to treat the RCRA as if it had a TAS provision by stating the
Campo Band of Mission Indian’s solid waste management plans were
adequate in 1995.133 The EPA’s approval was based on its belief that it had
the authority to declare tribal waste management plans as adequate,
notwithstanding that the tribes’ designation as a municipality under the
RCRA did not allow the EPA to approve these plans. 134 The D.C. Circuit
Court used Chevron to determine the extent of deference to the agency’s
findings. It found that the EPA failed Chevron’s first step because the
statute “directly [speaks] to the precise question at issue.”135 The court
found that the RCRA clearly identifies tribes as municipalities, not states,
and that the EPA “rewrote” the RCRA itself by saying the RCRA “now
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Du Bey, et. al., supra, at 454.
Id. at 452.
Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
Du Bey, et. al., supra, at 452.
Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. (punctuation original).
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reads: ‘States must, and Indian tribes may, but other local governments may
not’ adopt permit programs and submit them to the agency for review and
approval.”136 The court further opined that if Congress had intended to treat
tribes as states in the RCRA, it would have done so expressly, especially
given explicit TAS provisions in the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, and the Clean Water Act. 137
The court also acknowledged that a lack of primacy did not “strip the
tribe of its sovereign authority to govern its own affairs,” and only caused
the tribe to lose “the ability to take advantage of the leeway built into the
regulations, including the ability to take site-specific factors into
account.”138 The court further stated that while the RCRA’s tribal
municipality designation might be “unfair as a policy matter, . . . the
remedy lies with Congress, not with the EPA or the courts.”139 140
The lack of a TAS provision in the RCRA is significant to tribal
governments because, notwithstanding lacking the benefits of primacy
under the RCRA, tribal governments are still liable for compliance suits
brought under it.141 In Blue Legs, Oglala Sioux tribal members sued to bring
the Pine Ridge Reservation dumps into compliance with federal law. 142 The
Tribe argued it had sovereign immunity from the suit and that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and Indian Health Service (“IHS”) were solely
reasonable for bringing the dump into compliance. 143 Alternatively, the
tribe argued that if it was responsible for compliance, then remedies must
be exhausted in tribal court before suing in federal court.144
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the tribe. It held that the tribe was
liable for bringing the dump into federal compliance because the RCRA’s
definition of person includes municipalities and municipalities’ definition
includes Indian tribes.145 The court also found that there was sufficient
Congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity under the
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 151.
139. Id.
140. The court may have been more comfortable adopting a textual approach and
suggesting a Congressional remedy because sight-specific regulations were available
because the landfill at issue was in a seismic zone, and these facts gave “the tribe the
flexibility it [sought].” Id. at 152.
141. Blue Legs v. BIA, 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989).
142. Id. at 1095.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1097.
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RCRA.146 Additionally, the court held that the RCRA abrogated the general
preference for exhaustion in tribal courts for federal question or diversity
jurisdiction.147 Finally, the court rejected the tribe’s contention that the BIA
and the IHS were solely responsible for bringing the dump into compliance
because the tribe “established and operated” the dumps and also “generated
waste dumped at these sites.”148
B. Oklahoma Tribal TAS Status
Oklahoma tribes have been rendered ineligible for TAS status under
environmental laws. Specifically, Senator Inhofe’s so-called Midnight
Rider was attached to a 2005 statute and requires tribes to negotiate with
the State of Oklahoma to gain primacy for environmental laws, including
the Safe Drinking Water Act that was previously amended to include a TAS
provision. 149 The Midnight Rider was slipped into the bill without Senate
discussion and without consultation with Oklahoma tribes. 150
C. Tribal Solid Waste Programs
Many tribal governments have implemented their own solid waste
regulatory programs by utilizing their sovereign authority and even without
benefitting from the RCRA funding. The following examples from the
Cherokee, Muscogee (Creek), and Navajo Nations are intended to act as
surveys of tribal programs. They may also serve as templates for other
tribal governments wishing to enact their own solid waste regulations. All
three Nations articulate similar goals in their solid waste programs.
Specifically, the Nations envision using solid waste regulations to protect
public health, safety, and welfare, and to conserve natural resources and the
beauty of tribal lands. 151

146. Id. at 1097 (citing (1) the tribe’s municipality status, (2) Washington Department of
Ecology v. EPA’s finding that RCRA applied to Indian tribes, (3) and a House report
detailing concern about American Indian children playing in reservation dumps).
147. Blue Legs at 1097-98; see also Nat’l Farmer Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985) (concerning exhaustion requirements for federal question
jurisdiction); Iowa Mutual Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (concerning exhaustion
requirements for diversity jurisdiction).
148. Blue Legs at 1098.
149. Raymond Nolan, The Midnight Rider: The EPA and Tribal Self-Determination, 42
American Indian Quarterly 329, 329 (Summer 2018).
150. Id. at 334-35.
151. Cherokee Nation Code Annotated 63, Article 7 § 602 (encouraging recycling to
reach these goals); Muscogee (Creek) Nation Green Government Initiative §§ 701(B)(3) &
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1. Cherokee Nation
This paper will look at two Cherokee Nation waste codes, the Cherokee
Nation Solid Waste Code and the Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code.
a) Cherokee Nation Solid Waste Code
The Environmental Protection Commission (“EPC”) can create rules for
“permitting, posting of security, construction, operation, closure,
maintenance and remediation of solid waste disposal sites, borrow pits and
dredge and fill areas.”152 The program, at minimum, must include “the
collection of waste paper.”153 Solid waste transportation rules are to be at
least as stringent as the Department of Transportation or the Interstate
Commerce Commission rules.154 The EPC and its Administrator are
authorized to “implement and enforce” the RCRA and other federal laws
associated with solid waste management. 155
Persons156 are not to dispose of solid waste at sites unpermitted by the
EPC or operate sites unpermitted by the same. 157 Additionally, persons are
not to “knowingly transport solid waste to an unpermitted site or
facility.”158 However, persons can dispose of household solid waste on their
property if the disposal does not “create a nuisance or a hazard to the public
health or environment” or break other laws. 159 However, this disposal is not
to exceed “fifty tires, junk cars or similar waste” without a permit. 160
The statute also includes restrictions on granting permits for solid waste
disposal sites and facilities. Solid waste disposal sites cannot be “[w]ithin a
locally fractured or cavernous limestone or cherry limestone bedrock,”
cannot be within five miles of rural waste district wells that provide water
to customers, cannot be locations that otherwise “present unacceptable risks
to any water supply or any other beneficial use of surface water or
groundwater,” and cannot be within one-hundred-year floodplains. 161
(B)(4), 101(A) (focusing heavily on recycling measures to reach these aims); and Navajo
Solid Waste Act § 103(2).
152. Cherokee Nation Solid Waste Code § 605(A)(1).
153. Id. § 607(B).
154. Id. §605(A)(7).
155. Id. § 606.
156. See Id. § 603(14) (defining person to include individuals, business entities, and
cities, towns, and municipalities).
157. Id. § 608(A)(1)-(2).
158. Id. § 608(A)(3).
159. Id. § 608(B).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 608(H).
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Further, solid waste landfills cannot be located within five miles of
earthquake epicenters of 4.0 or higher on the Richter Scale or V on the
modified Mercalli Scale. 162 The EPC can also reject applications for sites
presenting “an unacceptable risk to public health, safety or welfare, natural
resources or the environment” with applicants being entitled to hearings to
determine the same. 163
The statute includes additional permitting restrictions for sites. Sites can
only accept non-hazardous industrial solid waste in areas outside of
“principal groundwater resources or recharge areas” or “on property owned
or operated by a person who also owns or operates a hazardous waste
facility.”164 Alternatively, the site can comport to the Cherokee Nation’s
hazardous waste requirements.165 Or, finally, it can store industrial solid
waste for noncommercial use by an industry or manufacturer.166
Finally, landfill owners or operators may need to submit vegetation
plans. These plans are designed to control erosion and dust, and for
“aesthetic enhancement.”167 A vegetation plan is required if the landfill is
“over fifty (50) feet in height above natural surface contours” and “accepts
more than two-hundred (200) tons per day of solid waste,” or if the site
“disturbs more than one acre of land.” 168
b) Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code
The Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code was passed in December
of 2005. It adopts federal minimums relating to “hazardous waste,
hazardous materials and hazardous substances.” 169 This includes the RCRA
minimums. 170 The act explicitly allows hazardous waste plans to be more
stringent than federal standards.171 It provides authority for Cherokee
governmental entities to “take all actions necessary to develop, implement
and enforce a comprehensive regulatory program for hazardous wastes and
materials.”172 The Administrator of the Cherokee Nation’s hazardous waste
162. Id. § 612(B)(2).
163. Id. § 608(I).
164. Id. § 612(A).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 614.
168. Id.
169. Cherokee Nation Code Annotated 63, Article 13 § 1302(A)-(A)(1) (hereafter cited
as Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 1302(C).
172. Id. § 1302(B).
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programs is also empowered to work with the EPA regarding “programing
activities.”173
The Cherokee Nation potentially claims authority outside of Cherokee
Indian Country. Specifically, it claims authority over Cherokee
Communities. These are defined as groups of people that are predominantly
composed of Cherokee Nation members “who reside in the same
geographic area and meet or work together on common goals.” 174 This
claimed authority also includes the ability to “[r]equire and approve or
disapprove disposal plans from all persons generating . . . or shipping
hazardous waste within, from, or into the Cherokee Nation.” 175
Additionally, the EPC is given authority over potentially wide geographic
areas to regulate “any existing” hazardous waste disposal site that threatens
to “migrate into waters of the Nation or otherwise cause adverse impacts on
public health, safety or the environment.” 176 This authority includes
requiring “closure, cleanup, restoration, or such protective activities as
double liners and leachate detection and collection measures.”177
The Commission can issue permits and create rules “relating to the
construction, operation, closure, post-closure, maintenance and monitoring
of hazardous waste facilities.”178 However, new permits for hazardous
waste sites cannot be approved after January 1, 2006,179 and existing
disposal sites are prohibited from receiving or incinerating hazardous waste
in Cherokee Nation after January 1, 2006.180 The EPC may also
“[p]romulgate such rules as they deem necessary or appropriate” to
implement this statute.181 Specifically, the EPC may restrict or prohibit land
disposal of hazardous waste, including “landfills, surface impoundments,
waste piles, deep injection wells, land treatment facilities, salt dome and
bed formations and underground mines or caves.” 182 The EPC is also
173. Id. § 1304(B)(10).
174. Id. § 1303(2).
175. Id. § 1304(B)(5) (emphasis added); see also Cherokee Nation Solid Waste Code §
603(14) (defining person to include individuals, business entities, and cities, towns, &
municipalities).
176. Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code § 1305(1).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 1304(A)(1).
179. Id. § 1308(A).
180. Id. § 1308(B); see also id. § 1317 (exempting hazardous waste facilities that
exclusively burn for recycling purposes and requiring any hazardous waste that is burned for
fuel to have a heating value of more than 5,000 BTUs).
181. Id. § 1304(A)(8).
182. Id. § 1304(A)(7).
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responsible for enforcing its own rules and the statute’s requirements. 183
This responsibility includes determining and enforcing penalties for
violating this statute and the EPC’s rules. 184 Further, the EPC is the final
arbitrator of administrative appeals relating to hazardous waste rules. 185
The Administrator is to make “information obtained by the Nation
regarding hazardous waste facilities and sites available to the public in . . .
the same manner” as would occur if the EPA carried out the program. 186
2. Muscogee (Creek) Nation
The Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s solid waste plan involves several parts,
including permitting, building codes, recycling, and solid waste collection,
the latter two being the focus of this survey. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation
potentially claims broad civil regulatory jurisdiction because the statute
applies to “any person who generates refuse in Muscogee (Creek) Nation
jurisdictional boundaries.”187
a) Recycling Initiatives
Recycling efforts are the foundational principal of the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation’s solid waste programs. Specifically, it requires “recycling of
recyclable materials to the fullest extent possible by the government of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and individuals or entities employed by the
Nation and by the citizens of the Nation.” 188 The statute requires
governmental buildings to separate “designated recyclable materials from
other refuse . . . without regard to whether the building’s solid waste is
collected by municipalities within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s
jurisdiction.”189 Those buildings that receive “city solid waste collection
183. Id. § 1304(A)(2).
184. Id. § 1304(A)(13).
185. Id. § 1304(A)(4).
186. Id. § 1304(B)(12).
187. Muscogee (Creek) Nation Green Government Initiative 40 § 5-103; see also id. § 5102(L) (defining person as individuals and business entities organized or existing under
Muscogee (Creek) law). Whether the Nation claims authority over non-Indians in its Indian
Country would depend on how broadly person is read (i.e., whether it extends only to
entities created by the Nation’s laws or if extends to entities recognized by the same). Given
that the statute tends to speak of Nation governmental entities and members, the Nation
likely does not intend to claim authority over non-Indians within its Indian Country. This
could become a live issue after the McGirt decision, which specifically involved this
Nation’s Indian Country.
188. Id. § 5-101.
189. Id. § 5-202.
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services” are required to separate recyclable materials from other refuse per
the statute’s requirements.190 Those that do not receive “city solid waste
collection” are still required to separate recyclable materials from other
refuse, and are required to develop a recycling plan to be approved by the
Commissioner.191 The Commission may request recycling plans from “[a]ll
commercial or governmental entities.”192
The Nation reasoned that an effective recycling program requires access
to recycling receptacles. The Nation planned on providing recycling
receptacles for residential dwellings. 193 However, commercial owners are
“responsible for the costs associated with separating recyclable
materials.”194 Recycling receptacles are also available from the Nation for
special events, but the number of recycling receptacles must equal the
number of solid waste receptacles, and the two must be placed next to each
other.195
The Nation also focused on education to further its recycling goals. All
the Nation’s “governmental establishments” are responsible for educating
“employees and/or resident users and patrons” of the recycling program’s
requirements. 196 This includes “written instructions” for materials to be
recycled, how these materials are to be prepared, how to use the collection
system, and updates to the programs. 197 This last educational requirement is
especially important because the statute reserves the Commission’s right to
amend the recyclable material list, even if it conflates with other statutes. 198
This likely requires governmental entities to stay abreast of changes in the
Nation’s recycling code to remain within compliance.
b) Solid Waste Regulations
Of the three Nations surveyed, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s plan puts
the most discretion in the hands of an administrative agency. The Office of
Environment Services (“OES”) is authorized to “[e]stablish requirements
for disposal, transfer, transport, treatment and storage of solid waste” to
“ensure public safety and protection of the environment to the greatest
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. § 5-202(A).
Id. § 5-202(B).
Id. § 5-203(C).
Id. § 5-203(A)(1).
Id. § 5-203(B).
Id. §§ 5-204(1) and (2).
Id. § 5-205.
Id.
Id. § 5-203(D).
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extent possible.”199 It can also “[r]equire methods of pollution prevention,
waste reduction, conservation, avoidance or mitigation of impacts,”200 and
establish “processes and procedures for the sampling and submission of
environmental impact statements.”201 Further, it can create rules for solid
waste transportation that must be at least as stringent as those established by
the United States Department of Transportation or the Interstate Commerce
Commission.202 Additionally, the OES can establish “comprehensive solid
waste management rules and best management practices.” 203 It can further
create standards for cleaning up “groundwater, surface waters, or
contaminated soils resulting from releases, spills or other activities” 204 and
it can enforce applicable federal laws and regulations.205 Finally, the OES is
required to “promulgat[e] rules and regulations” that “encourage and
promote recycling and reuse of recoverable materials” because such efforts
are “necessary for the public safety, health, interest and economic welfare”
and these recycling efforts can “substantially reduce production and
disposal costs, save tribal lands[,] conserve natural resources and protect the
environment.”206
3. Navajo Nation
The Navajo Nation’s regulations are the most comprehensive of those
surveyed. This paper looks at two statutes: the Navajo Nation Solid Waste
Act (“Solid Waste Act”) and the Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations.
a) Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act
The Navajo Nation, like the other Nations surveyed, claims broad
authority. The Solid Waste Act applies “to all persons and all property
within the Navajo Nation,”207 except those with whom there are covenants
“not to regulate or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over such person or
property.”208

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. § 7-102(A)(1).
Id. §7-102(A)(2).
Id. §7-102(A)(3).
Id. §7-102(A)(4).
Id. §7-102(A)(6).
Id. §7-102(A)(9).
Id. §§ 7-102(a)(9) and (10).
Id. § 7-104.
Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 104(A).
Id. § 104(B).
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The Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency is the primary
organ for enforcing this statute.209 The Director of this agency is authorized
to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his/her
functions” under the act; to enforce the provisions of the act; issue permits,
assess fees, and conduct investigations, among other tasks; “accept, receive
and administer grants or other funds” from groups to administer the act’s
purposes; and “perform such other activities as the Director may find
necessary to carry out his/her functions under this chapter.”210 Specifically,
the Director may create regulations for “solid waste landfills, transfer
stations, composting facilities, collection and transportation of solid waste
and recycling.”211 But the Director’s promulgated rules must be at least as
stringent as those under the RCRA. 212
The statute allows variances to the Director’s rules under certain
circumstances. Owners may petition the Director for variances if “hardships
[are] caused by, but not limited to, isolation and extreme weather
conditions,” but the variances cannot “endanger public health, safety,
welfare or the environment” and cannot violate 40 C.F.R. Parts 257 or
258.213 Variances are not intended to be permanent or a circumvention of
the rules: owners/operators must create “a detailed plan for the completion
of corrective steps needed to conform” to the statute and the Director’s
rules, there must be a “fixed term for the variance,” and the Director may
periodically inspect the facility. 214 Further, the Director may renew, 215
suspend,216 or revoke217 variances.
The statute establishes requirements and procedures for landfill permits.
Permits for solid waste facilities are to be for fixed terms not exceeding
thirty years.218 If a facility does not comply with the statute or the
Director’s rule, then the permit must specify when the facility must
complete necessary modifications. 219 Additionally, the Director must allow
209. Id. § 103(3).
210. Id. §§ 107(A)(1)-(2), (4)-(5), (7), and (11)-(12).
211. Id. § 301(A).
212. Id. § 107(A) (suggesting also that the Director should consider the factors
established by RCRA Subtitle D).
213. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 302(A) and Navajo Nation Solid Waste
Regulations § 106(A).
214. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act §§ 301(B)(1)-(3).
215. Id. § 301(C).
216. Id. § 301(D).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 403(A).
219. Id.
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applicants time to remedy deficiencies in their application. 220 The Director
may revoke permits for failure to comply with the permit’s terms, failure to
comply with the statute’s regulations, or “fraud, deceit” or submitting
“inaccurate information.”221 The Director is required to publicly disclose
the “final determination regarding any permit under this chapter” and must
schedule a public hearing if the Director receives a written request for one
“within 15 days of publication” of the public disclosure.222
Additionally, the statute contains procedures for the Director’s creation
of rules. The Director must give public notice of proposed rules, including
allowing the public to state its views orally or in writing. 223 The Director is
also required to respond in writing to “each significant [public]
comment.”224 The Director’s rules are also subject to the Navajo Supreme
Court’s review. 225 This review has important implications. Judicial review
for the Director’s final actions are not available if the action could have
been reviewed by the Navajo Supreme Court but was not. 226 This
prohibition does not apply if the rule was objected to “with reasonable
specificity” during the public comment period. 227 Further, if the objection
was “impracticable to raise” within the public comment period, the Director
must “convene a proceeding” to reconsider the regulation within the
judicial review period.228 If this proceeding does not occur, then the Navajo
Supreme Court may hear the objection. 229 Courts may reverse a Director’s
final action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with the law”; “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations or short of statutory right”; “outside of procedural
requirements”; or “unsupported by substantial evidence.”230
While this statute gives the Director wide discretion for creating rules, it
also contains certain limitations. It is illegal to “dispose of any solid waste
in a manner that will harm the environment, endanger the public health,
safety and welfare or create a public nuisance” or somewhere “other than a
220. Id.
221. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 404 and Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations
§§ 509(A)-(C).
222. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 404(B).
223. Id. § 601(A)(1).
224. Id. § 601(A)(2).
225. Id. § 602(A).
226. Id. § 601 (B)(1).
227. Id. § 602(B)(2).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. § 602(C).
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facility which is in compliance with these regulations.”231 This prohibition
excludes the “on-site disposal of on-site generated solid waste from a
family ranch, camp or farm” if it does not “create a public health or
environmental hazard or public nuisance.”232 Further, one must have a
permit to “construct, operate or modify a solid waste landfill facility” unless
it meets the above § 201(B) exception of a family ranch, camp, or farm. 233
Additionally, “bulk or non-containerized liquids” cannot by disposed of in
solid waste facilities.234 It is also illegal to interfere with or prohibit
“inspection, entry or monitoring[ ] activities.” 235 Owner/operators cannot
openly burn solid waste at their facilities. 236 Owner/operators can be
required to keep records regarding installation or monitoring of equipment,
audit procedures, and emission samples,237 and these records must be
publicly available unless it qualifies as a trade secret. 238
The Navajo Solid Waste Act invokes civil regulatory, civil adjudicatory,
and criminal jurisdiction. The Director is authorized to issue and serve
compliance orders, administrative penalty orders, or bring civil or criminal
action on persons “conducting an activity that threatens human health or the
environment” or who have violated the statute or the Director’s orders. 239
Civil actions include injunctions.240 Criminal penalties require an
intentional mens rea and invoke fines between $500 and $5,000 per day per
violation and/or 180 days of imprisonment. 241 Administrative order
penalties can be “up to $10,000 per day per violation” but are not to exceed
$100,000 total.242 Additionally, those who have “consistently violated any
requirements or prohibitions” can be prohibited from operating solid waste

231. Id. §§ 201(A)(1)-(2).
232. Id. § 201(B).
233. Id. § 202.
234. Id. § 201(A)(4).
235. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 201(A)(6); see Navajo Nation Solid Waste
Regulations § 201.
236. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 203 and Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations §
203.
237. Navajo Solid Waste Act § 501(A).
238. Id. § 501(C). The statute does not define trade secret, but assuming it follows the
general American legal meaning, it would be information that “has economic value, remains
secret . . . and [for which] reasonable security measures are taken.” Stephen M. McJohn,
Intellectual Property: Examples & Explanations 516 (6th ed. 2019).
239. Navajo Solid Waste Act § 502(A).
240. Id. § 502(E).
241. Id. § 503(B).
242. Id. § 504(A).
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facilities or contracting for the same. 243 Cash penalties received from
violations are to be used “to finance solid waste management compliance
and enforcement activities.”244
Additionally, the statute authorizes citizen suits. They can be raised
against anyone that violates the statute or Director-promulgated rules
except the Navajo Nation or its instrumentalities, but tribal enterprises may
be sued. 245 Citizen suits are permitted for “past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid waste . . . [that] present[s]
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment”
and violate the statute or the Director’s rules. 246 There are also limitations to
citizen suits.247
b) Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations
The Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations (“Regulations”) were
passed after the Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act. The Regulations recodifies portions of the Act but also contains additional rules.
The Solid Waste Regulations prohibit landfills in certain areas. These
include wetlands, flood plains, the habitats of threatened or endangered
species, and prime farmland. 248 Additionally, landfills are prohibited in
“[h]istorically, archeologically or culturally significant sites” unless the
landfill complies with the Navajo Cultural Resources Protection Act and
other tribal and federal laws. 249 Further, landfills are prohibited on seismic
zones unless the owner/operator demonstrates that “all structures . . . are
designed to resist maximum horizontal acceleration in lithified earth
material for the site.”250

243. Id. § 502(A).
244. Id. §§ 503(E)(3) and 505(E).
245. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 505(A)(1).
246. Id.
247. See Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 505(B)(1) (requiring sixty days’ notice to the
Director before filing a citizen suit for violations of the statute or the Director’s rules and
preempting citizen suits if the Director is “diligently prosecuting an administrative or a civil
action”); § 105(B)(2) (requiring ninety days’ notice for citizen suits for actions that do not
violate the statute or rule but that allegedly harm health or the environment, and preempting
the citizen suit if the Director is pursuing an administrative or civil action); and § 505(C)(2)
(allowing the Director to intervene in citizen suits).
248. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 402(A)(1).
249. Id. § 402(A)(5).
250. Id. § 402(A)(7).
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Landfills are further restricted under the Regulations. First, open
dumping is prohibited. 251 Next, solid waste landfills are required to use
methane gas monitoring and control systems. 252 Landfills are to be located
and operated to avoid “a public nuisance or potential hazard to public
health, welfare or the environment and in a manner to control disease
vectors and odors.”253 All landfills must also have a contingency plan
“designed to minimize hazards to human health or the environment from
fires, explosions or any unplanned sudden or non-sudden release of
contaminants or hazardous waste constituents to air, soil, surface water or
ground water.”254
The Director is empowered to grant variances if they do not “endanger
the public health or harm the environment.”255 However, the Regulations
provide an additional barrier to issuing variances: the owner/operator must
establish that the variances do not harm public health or the environment by
clear and convincing evidence. 256 Additionally, variances are not to be
granted “until the Director has considered the relative interests of the
owner/operator, and other users of property likely to be affected and the
general public.”257
The Director is also given additional authority under the Regulations.
Either the Director or Health Advisor can “enter any solid waste disposal,
collection, transfer station or composting facility” to inspect or investigate
(including the vehicles or equipment of solid waste transporters), take
samples, inspect records, conduct studies, “take corrective action,” and
enforce regulations.258
The Regulations also contain additional requirements for permits. Navajo
Nation permits are granted conditionally on the Director’s right to inspect
the facility and the facility’s records. 259 Permits are further conditioned on
the owner/operator’s consent to Navajo jurisdiction. 260 Permit applications
are also public record, with the public receiving the right to comment on the
granting and modification of an application, and corrective actions against
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. § 206.
Id. § 403(E).
Id. § 404(A)(2)(a).
Id. § 404(C)(1).
Id. § 106(A).
Id. § 106(B)(2).
Id. § 106(B)(3).
Id. §§ 302(A)-(B).
Id. § 504.
Id.
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owner/operators.261 A permit is unnecessary to “own, operate or maintain a
solid waste transfer station.”262 A composting facility requires a permit
unless it “occupies less than 5 acres, uses only water or an inoculant as an
additive and utilizes no more than 50% manure in the final mix, and does
not compost treated sewage sludge or solid waste.” 263
Transporters of solid waste must use vehicle “covers or enclosures to
prevent solid waste from being released during collection/transportation”
and collection and transportation must satisfy the EPA Guideline for Solid
Waste Storage and Collection. 264 Solid waste generators must provide
containers for the waste unless it is “construction/demolition waste, yard
waste and white goods.”265 “Storage facilities shall be insect-, rodent- and
leak-proof” and construction and yard waste and white goods must be
stored “to prevent insect and rodent harborage, environmental and safety
hazards and protect public health.”266
IV. McGirt
McGirt was a 5-4 Supreme Court decision that found a large section of
eastern Oklahoma—the Muscogee (Creek) Nation—is still Indian Country
because Congress failed to disestablish the reservation statutorily. It also
limited the application of contemporaneous events and demographics to
show disestablishment.267 The re-recognition of Indian Country means the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation could exert civil regulatory jurisdiction
(including solid waste regulation) over non-Indians in eastern Oklahoma. It
also raises the possibility that other tribes’ reservations were not
disestablished via explicit Congressional statute.
A. Background
The Petitioner was convicted of “three serious sexual offenses” in an
Oklahoma state court.268 He argued that the state lacked jurisdiction
because he was a tribal member of the Seminole Nation and because his
261. Id. § 505.
262. Id. § 702.
263. Id. § 802.
264. Id. § 902 (citing to 40 C.F.R. 243).
265. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 903(A).
266. Id. § 903(B).
267. But cf. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (suggesting that there could be
situations where contemporaneous events and demographics could evidence
disestablishment).
268. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020).
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crimes took place in Indian Country, specifically on the Muscogee (Creek)
Reservation in northeastern Oklahoma. 269 He argued, therefore, that the
federal courts had jurisdiction under the MCA. 270 The MCA gives the
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over certain enumerated crimes
(including Petitioner’s) committed in Indian Country by an American
Indian. 271 The parties all agreed that Petitioner’s “crimes were committed
on lands described as the Creek Reservation in an 1866 treaty and federal
statute.”272 The Petitioner argued this was still Indian Country. 273 Oklahoma
argued that the land was no longer a reservation and had lost its Indian
Country status.274 The question before the Court was whether lands
promised to the Creek Nation remained “an Indian reservation for purposes
of federal criminal law.”275
B. Discussion and Holding
1. Disestablishment
Oklahoma first argued that Congress created no reservation, but the
Supreme Court held that Congress had established a Creek Reservation in
what is now Oklahoma. It was established “[i]n a series of treaties” that
“establish[ed] boundary lines” for the Creek’s “‘permanent home.’” 276
Congress promised that the land “will forever” be secured and guaranteed
to the Creeks.277 The title to the land was guaranteed to the Creeks “‘so long
as they shall exist as a nation, and continue to occupy the country hereby
assigned to them.’”278
Oklahoma argued that Congress did not create a reservation because the
treaty initially granting the land did not call it a reservation. 279 However, the
Court previously found that similar contemporaneous treaty language had
created reservations.280 Further, a later 1866 treaty that reduced Muscogee
(Creek) holdings explicitly called the remaining lands a reservation and
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a)).
Id. at 2460.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2459.
Id. at 2460.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405 (1968).
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stated that this reservation “would ‘be forever set apart as a home for said
Creek Nation.’”281 Therefore, Congress did create a reservation for the
Creek Nation because it was intended to be a permanent home and meant as
a place where the Creek Nation was “assured a right to self-government”
that lied “outside both the legal jurisdiction and geographic boundaries of
any State.”282 To the Court, this meant that “[u]nder any definition” the
Muscogee (Creek) lands were established as a reservation. 283
Oklahoma’s next argument was that if a reservation was created for the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, it no longer existed. The Court admitted that the
land “once divided and held by the Tribe . . . is now fractured into
pieces.”284 Additionally, much of the land belongs “to persons unaffiliated
with the Nation.”285 However, to answer whether the Muscogee (Creek)
Reservation still exists, the Court may look only to one place: “the acts of
Congress.”286 Under Solem, only Congress can disestablish reservations,
and its intent to do so must be clear, even if disestablishment requires no
“particular form of words.”287 While Congress may “breach its own
promises and treaties” vis-à-vis reservations, that power “belongs to
Congress alone” and courts cannot “lightly . . . infer” disestablishment. 288
The Court required disestablishment to be shown through a
Congressional statute, and as such, several of Oklahoma’s arguments about
non-statutory disestablishment were rejected. The Creek Allotment Act of
1901 did not disestablish the reservation because allotment lacked a
“‘present and total surrender of all tribal interests’ in the affected land”;
courts had previously rejected state claims that “allotments automatically
ended reservations”; and Indian Country’s definition “expressly
contemplates private land ownership within reservation boundaries” when it
includes “‘land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . .
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation.” 289 Intrusions on the Creek’s self281. McGirt at 2460.
282. Id. at 2462.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citation omitted).
288. Id. (citation omitted).
289. Id. at 2463-64 (quoting 18 U.SC. § 1151(a)). The Court further rejected the claim
that because allotment was often the first step towards disestablishment, it must have
resulted in disestablishment, stating that equating “allotment with disestablishment would
confuse the first step of a march with arrival at its destination.” Id. at 2465.
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governance, including abolishing tribal courts, requiring Presidential
approval for tribal ordinances affecting tribal land or tribal property, and the
abolishment of the Creek tribal government in 1906 did not disestablish the
reservation.290 The tribe, in fact, maintained “significant sovereign
functions over the lands in question,” including taxation, schooling, tribal
ordinances not affecting land, and overseeing the allotment process. 291
Oklahoma’s assertion that Solem allowed contemporary events or later
events and demographics to evidence disestablishment was rejected by the
Court. The Court only recognized one step in Solem: Congressional statutes
stating there was disestablishment. 292 The only reason courts should consult
“contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices” is to “shed light” on the
ambiguous language used by Congress when disestablishing a
reservation.293 Those events and facts cannot show disestablishment facially
because they have “‘limited interpretive value’” and are the “‘least
compelling form of evidence.’”294
Oklahoma also argued that the Creek land constituted a dependent Indian
community, not a reservation.295 However, the Court remarked that this
semantic argument did not change the law: Indian Country includes
dependent Indian communities that would still preclude Oklahoma from
exercising criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.296 Oklahoma then asked
the Court not only to rule that Muscogee (Creek) Nation existed as a
dependent Indian community, but that this status made the land easier to
disestablish than if it was a reservation. 297 But the Court refused. The
Muscogee (Creek) Nation had a reservation, in part because “a host of
federal statutes” repeatedly referenced a “Creek Reservation,” while other
statutes promised the Creeks a “permanent home” that would be “forever
set apart” and where the Creeks would be “secured in the unrestricted rights
of self-government.”298 The Court further rejected Oklahoma’s contention
that the Creeks did not have a reservation because they originally owned the
land in fee. Owning the land in fee, according to the Court, still satisfied the
290. Id. at 2465-66. The majority believed his latter event tended to show that Congress
did not disestablish the reservation via allotment in 1901 and that Presidential review would
suggest the tribe still had authority to legislate. Id. at 2466.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2468.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2469 (citation omitted).
295. Id. at 2474.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2474-75.
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condition “that a reservation must be land ‘reserved from sale’” because the
fee land could still not be given to others without confiscating the land. 299
The Court also rejected the “scattered references” that called the Creek
lands something besides a reservation because “the most authoritative
evidence of the Creek’s relationship to the land” is “the treaties and statutes
that promised the land to the Creeks in the first place.” 300 These laws
pointed to a reservation, and the Court rejected “the untenable suggestion
that, when the federal government agreed to offer more protection for tribal
lands [by granting the Creeks fee title], it really provided less.” 301 Overall,
the Court maintained that certain words are not necessary to establish or
disestablish a reservation.302
2. Oklahoma’s Exemption from the Major Crimes Act
Failing to prove that the Muscogee (Creek) reservation was already
disestablished or non-existent, Oklahoma alternatively argued that it was
exempt from the MCA. Oklahoma argued this exemption was based on the
interplay between Oklahoma’s unique territorial history and its enabling
act. The historical argument began with Oklahoma being composed of two
territories: Indian Territory in the east and Oklahoma Territory in the west.
In 1897, federal courts were given exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
Indian Territory. 303 Additionally, the 1898 Curtis Act abolished tribal courts
in Indian Territory.304 According to Oklahoma, these facts had some sort of
bearing on the intention behind the enabling act vis-à-vis criminal
jurisdiction. Oklahoma argued that when its enabling act transferred all
pending cases from federal territorial courts to state courts, it inherited “the
federal territorial courts’ sweeping authority to try Indians for crimes
committed on reservations.”305 However, the Court stated the enabling act
“sent state-law cases to state court and federal-law cases to federal court,”
the latter including crimes arising under the MCA. 306 Oklahoma further
contended that because it continued to try cases falling under the MCA, it
inherited criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country; however, the Court
asserted that Oklahoma’s “own courts have acknowledged that the State’s
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 2475.
Id. at 2476.
Id.
Id. at 2475.
Id. at 2476.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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historic practices deviated in meaningful ways from the MCA’s terms.” 307
Oklahoma’s unilateral assumption of criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country did not establish an MCA exemption for Oklahoma. 308
The Court further rejected Oklahoma’s policy concerns over rerecognizing a large swathe of Indian Country. Specifically, Oklahoma was
concerned that the majority’s ruling could overturn “an untold number of
convictions.”309 However, the Court believed that its ruling would only
disrupt a small number of convictions, and under McBratney, Oklahoma
would still have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian on non-Indian crime
in Indian Country.310 Additionally, Oklahoma’s assertion that the MCA did
not apply there could also overturn federal convictions secured under MCA
authority. 311 The concern of overturned convictions was largely overlooked:
“In any event, the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate
it.”312 The Court held that the MCA applies to Oklahoma, in large part
because Congress never specifically expanded Oklahoma’s criminal
jurisdiction to include Indian Country. 313
3. McGirt’s Applicability to Other Tribes and to Civil Jurisdiction
Another of Oklahoma’s rejected concerns was that the majority ruling
would re-expand Indian Country. Specifically, Oklahoma was concerned
that other courts could use this ruling and tribal treaties to find “that
perhaps as much as half of its land and roughly 1.8 million residents could
wind up within Indian country.”314 The Court did not reject that possibility
out of hand, but stated that “[e]ach tribe’s treaties must be considered on
their own terms.”315 This raises the possibility that allotted areas that were
not explicitly disestablished could be re-recognized as Indian Country.
Future analysis relying on McGirt would need to look specifically at the
laws to determine if disestablishment occurred.

307. Id. at 2478.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2479.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2480.
313. Id. at 2478.
314. Id. at 2478-79.
315. Id. at 2479; see also Berry v. Braggs, 2020 WL 6205849, 4-5 (N.D. Okla.) (finding
that McGirt’s holding did not extend to federal jurisdiction in Cherokee Nation by relying on
the Supreme Court’s language that, “Each tribe’s treaties must be considered on their own
terms”).
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The Supreme Court refused to discuss McGirt’s applicability to civil
adjudicatory and regulatory law. The Supreme Court stated that the
question before it was the MCA’s definition of Indian Country. 316 However,
the Court did not foreclose the possibility of using McGirt to expand civil
jurisdiction into re-recognized Indian Country, because while “often
nothing requires other civil statutes or regulations to rely on definitions
found in the criminal law . . . many federal civil laws and regulations do
currently borrow from § 1151 when defining the scope of Indian
country.”317 But, in dicta, one district court judge has already expressed the
belief that McGirt should be read narrowly, stating, “By its terms, McGirt
only applies to defendants who commit certain crimes within the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation Reservation.”318 Notwithstanding that opinion, applying
criminal decisions to civil jurisdiction has been supported by the Supreme
Court: “Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal criminal
jurisdiction, we have recognized that it also generally applies to questions
of civil jurisdiction.”319
V. McGirt’s Potential Impact and Policy Recommendations
McGirt could be used to re-recognize Indian Country, but few tribes may
have the Muskogee Creek’s unique statutory history to support rerecognition. Tribes with re-recognized Indian Country could also expand
their civil regulatory programs, including solid waste, into those areas. This
possibility may be enough to encourage Congress to amend the RCRA to
include a TAS provision. Congress should also revoke the Oklahoma TAS
exemption. Finally, tribal governments should establish their own solid
waste regulations, including efforts to cooperate with state and local
governments to create more nationally comprehensive solid waste
regulation.
A. McGirt’s Impact on Tribal Solid Waste Regulation
McGirt poses a puzzle for tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction moving
forward. First, one must wonder how much land will be re-recognized as
316. McGirt at 2480.
317. Id. (emphasis added); see also Salas v. Off. of Hawai’ian Aff. Bd. of Tr., 2020 WL
4590731, 1 (M.D. Ga.) (distinguishing McGirt: Plaintiff committed no crime but was denied
benefits from a state agency and then attempted “to challenge the legitimacy of Hawai’i’s
state government by citing McGirt).
318. Barnett v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2021 WL 325716, 3-5 (W.D. Okla.) (dismissing
a habeas petition for procedural reasons).
319. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
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Indian Country. McGirt clarified Solem and clearly stated that questions
about disestablishment will be based on the legislation disestablishing a
reservation. But Congress clearly disestablished many reservations other
than the Muskogee Creek’s, meaning there may be a small number of rerecognized reservations.
Second, tribal responses to McGirt will largely depend on how courts
read it moving forward. Courts could take a literal view of McGirt’s posed
question: defining Indian Country under the MCA. Additionally, courts that
are unfamiliar with the nuances of Indian law and tribal jurisdiction could
assume that because McGirt is a criminal jurisdiction case and Indian
Country is defined under the federal criminal code, McGirt is inapplicable
to civil jurisdiction. Such a limited reading is not wholly clear from the
case. The Supreme Court also has previously stated that while Indian
Country is defined under the criminal code, it applies to civil contexts, as
well. Finally, the death of Justice Ginsburg, a member of the McGirt
majority, leads to some unpredictability about applying McGirt to the civil
field moving forward.
Assuming more land is re-recognized as Indian Country and assuming
there is a general acceptance that tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction
(including solid waste programs) could be extended there, tribes should
craft their programs under Montana’s requirements. Specifically,
Montana’s second prong of protecting health could be a justification for
expanding tribal solid waste programs, but likely only if the tribal program
is more stringent than what is already in place. Additionally, the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation and other nations possibly impacted by McGirt should be
weary of potential RCRA liability traps. Specifically, tribes—already liable
for failures to adhere to the RCRA standards—may face liability for areas
without adequate solid waste programs that were not within tribal control
before re-recognition. At the very least, a potential lawsuit along those lines
could be costly. One possible response (discussed more fully below) is to
create tribal solid waste management programs that establish federal
standards as a minimum.
B. Policy Recommendations
1. Congressional Recommendations
First, Congress should amend the RCRA to include a TAS provision for
tribal governments. This brings the RCRA into line with other federal
environmental statutes that have TAS provisions. Specifically, both the
Safe Drinking Water Act and the RCRA’s purposes are to protect the
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quality of water,320 and there is little policy rationale for excluding the
RCRA from having a TAS provision when the Safe Drinking Water Act
includes a TAS provision.
Amending the RCRA better fulfills Congress’s trust responsibility
towards tribes, especially financially, and increases tribal selfdetermination. Tribes are put in a difficult position because they must
maintain the RCRA-mandated protections to avoid liability but do not
receive funding to do so. By stacking the financial deck against tribes,
Congress has failed in its guardian role. Additionally, amending the RCRA
also increases tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Specifically, it
would enable tribes to work directly with the EPA to develop plans that
meet a tribe’s specific needs. It also better encourages tribes to develop
expertise in the fields of solid and hazardous waste management.
Amending the RCRA to treat tribes like states also increases the
likelihood of more comprehensive national environmental programs. This is
because federal funding could allow more effective implementation of the
RCRA requirements by tribes. It enables tribes to establish federal
minimum standards and more effectively implement programs that fit the
needs of their specific geographic locations and their members’ needs. This,
in turn, reduces the risk of gaps in environmental protection over substantial
segments of the nation, especially if the gaps exist for financial reasons.
Second, Congress should repeal the Oklahoma tribal TAS prohibition.
This is because it serves no real purpose. It hampers the EPA’s ability “to
continue [its] close relationship with tribal nations,” specifically for statutes
that already have TAS provisions. 321 It also hampers the EPA’s core
responsibility—upholding the nation’s environmental laws—by removing
its involvement among a sizable proportion of Oklahoma’s population. 322
Further, it reduces tribal self-determination in Oklahoma by requiring tribes
to negotiate directly with Oklahoma for primacy. This negotiation
requirement runs contrary to how environmental statutes generally work. It
is true that primacy often requires applying to the EPA, but this application
process generally has specific metrics that the program must reach.
Negotiating with the state raises the possibility that primacy is based on
something besides the effectiveness of a tribe’s environmental plan. This, in
turn, increases the risk of regulatory gaps in Oklahoma’s Indian Country.
This possibility directly contradicts the purpose of federal environmental
320. See Nolan, supra, 332-32.
321. Id. at 338.
322. Id.
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laws and implicates the very reason the federal government became actively
involved in environmental regulation: failures to regulate state
environments. But in this case, the state could place external barriers on
effective environmental regulation to the determinant of Oklahomans:
American Indian and non-Indian alike.
Additionally, Oklahoma tribes would greatly benefit from TAS
provisions. This is because Oklahoma has such a large American Indian
population,323 because Indian Country is such a substantial portion of the
state,324 and because of the strength of many of Oklahoma’s tribes.
Finally, the Midnight Rider circumvented how Congress interacts with
Oklahoma tribes.325 By requiring Oklahoma tribes to negotiate for primacy
with the state, 326 the Midnight Rider acts like a substitute for partial P.L.
280 jurisdiction, which was accomplished without tribal consent. This
legislative gamesmanship is contrary to Congress’s guardian role. The
Midnight Rider is an attack on tribal self-determination and sovereignty. It
does nothing to protect tribal environments in Oklahoma.
2. Tribal Recommendations
Tribes should actively seek to implement solid waste regulations and
programs. First, tribes should carefully delineate their regulatory authority.
While tribal sovereignty exists and many Supreme Court decisions have
recognized it, tribes often face tension when dealing with state
governments. By properly defining and claiming regulatory authority
within legally recognized boundaries, tribal governments are more likely to
ease tensions with state governments. Specifically, tribes should only claim
authority over persons within Montana’s test, likely relying on the second
prong to protect the health of tribal members. This could ease tensions with
state governments and, in the process, increase the effectiveness of tribal
programs.
Tribal solid waste programs should also establish federal minimums as a
floor. This should include implementing both a solid waste and hazardous
waste program as required by the RCRA. Setting federal standards as the
323. According to the CDC, Oklahoma had the largest population of American Indians in
2013. CDC, Tribal Population (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/
tribal/tribes-organizations-health/tribes/state-population.html.
324. A map produced by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation in 2010 shows that
must of Oklahoma is covered by various tribal nation land. (last accessed Feb. 13, 2021)
https://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/map_tribal_jurisdictions.pdf.
325. Nolan, supra, at 337.
326. Id. at 329.
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minimum would increase the likelihood of a comprehensive, national solid
waste regulatory system. It could also ease transitions to EPA involvement
if Congress amends the RCRA to include a tribal TAS provision. Perhaps in
states with higher minimums, tribal governments could set those state
standards as the floor. Tribes implementing state standards should perhaps
copy the state minimums into their codes versus relying on crossreferencing to a state provision, especially because state standards can
change more quickly than federal standards. Mostly, tribal governments
should look closely at their abilities and tailor programs to the
government’s capability. Additionally, tribes with the ability, expertise, and
history to establish administrative agencies may benefit from the dynamism
and expertise such entities provide.
Further, tribal governments could focus on educational programs within
their larger solid waste program, like the Muscogee (Creek) Nation does.
This could be an opportunity to teach about the effects of climate change
and perhaps be an opportunity to discuss landmarks and important sites
within tribal land. Also, tribal governments might utilize public
involvement in regulatory processes like the Navajo Nation does. This
could lead to better-tailored programs and result in more compliance,
especially if the populace feels they helped to create the program. Lastly,
allowing citizen suits could increase the enforceability of environmental
regulations.
VI. Conclusion
Tribal governments are a key component of the United States’ federal
system, especially within environmental federalism. While many tribes
have created their own solid waste management programs without the
benefits of the RCRA primacy and funding, a TAS provision could improve
these programs. TAS provisions would also better serve tribal governments
by easing potential liability under RCRA’s minimum requirements,
specifically by enabling funding to reach federal minimums. Tribes without
solid waste programs should establish their own programs based on the
needs, expertise, and ability of the tribe. But these programs should also
maintain federal minimums. Lastly, whether McGirt will drastically reshape
Indian Country throughout the United States will largely depend on whether
disestablishment of specific reservations was accomplished statutorily and
whether courts are willing to continue extending Indian criminal definitions
to civil jurisdiction.
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